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ABSTRACT
Intelligent Log Analysis for Anomaly Detection
By Steven Yen
Computer logs are a rich source of information that can be analyzed to detect various issues. The
large volumes of logs limit the effectiveness of manual approaches to log analysis. The earliest automated
log analysis tools take a rule-based approach, which can only detect known issues with existing rules. On
the other hand, anomaly detection approaches can detect new or unknown issues. This is achieved by
looking for unusual behavior different from the norm, often utilizing machine learning (ML) or deep
learning (DL) models. In this project, we evaluated various ML and DL techniques used for log anomaly
detection. We propose a hybrid neural network (NN) we call "CausalConvLSTM" for modeling log
sequences, which takes advantage of both Convolutional Neural Network and Long Short-Term Memory
Network's strengths. Furthermore, we evaluated and proposed a concrete strategy for retraining NN
anomaly detection models to maintain a low false-positive rate in a drifting environment.
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1 - Introduction
Computer systems generate large volumes of logs recording various events of interest. These can be
generated by various sources including operating systems, network devices, applications, and so on. These
logs are used by developers and system administrators for troubleshooting, auditing, and identifying various
issues.
As computing systems become more complex and the scale grows, the volumes of logs generated also
increase tremendously. The manual analysis of logs using search utilities become ineffective, as it is often
hard for humans to correlate events across large volumes of logs across time and many different systems.
Additionally, manually analysis by humans is often not timely enough to keep up with the large throughput
of events. This resulted in the development of automated log analysis tools, the earliest of which are rulebased systems. These systems rely on a set of rules (in a rule-set) written by experts, defining the patterns of
interest. A rule-engine then applies those rules to new, incoming events to detect if there’s a match and take
the appropriate actions [1]. These systems are efficient and can quickly identify matches. Unfortunately, they
can only detect known issues for which a rule exists in the rule-set. These types of systems cannot detect
new or unknown issues for which there are no existing rules.
To address the shortfall of rule-based systems, anomaly-based systems were developed, which leverage
statistical, machine learning (ML), or deep learning (DL) techniques to mine large volumes of data to extract
insights and learn their own evaluation criteria. Of these, deep learning (DL) techniques utilizing deep
Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) with many layers showed the most promising results. However, these
models require long training time before they can be used for detection. To improve the training time while
maintaining good accuracy, we propose a hybrid model that uses a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN)
in conjunction with a Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) network. In our proposed model called
“CausalConvLSTM”, we first use causal convolutions with variable-sized filters to extract features based on
different sequence lengths to construct a rich feature map that preserves ordering significance. Then, we use
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a LSTM network to ingest the resulting feature map in order to summarize the result into a hidden state
vector that is then passed to a fully-connected (FC) layer to make predictions. Based on our experiments, the
hybrid architecture achieves competitive accuracies while significantly reducing the training time.
Another major challenge anomaly detection systems face is concept drift, which is the change in normal
system behavior over time. Concept drift is an especially important issue in computing systems, which can
change significantly over time for various reasons such as increase/decrease in the number of users, hardware
changes (upgrade/downgrade), or software changes (introduction of new features). The result of this is that
an anomaly detection system that is trained on normal system behavior from a baseline period will see a
reduction in accuracy, as the normal system behavior becomes increasingly different form its behavior during
the baseline period. To address this, we evaluated various strategies for updating anomaly detection models
to adapt to concept drift. In the end, we propose a concrete strategy for retraining DL models based on falsepositive rates calculated from a rolling window.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 will provide additional background and present related
works. Section 3 will describe the problem of log anomaly detection we’re addressing. Section 4 will
describe our proposed solution including the refined architecture and the retraining strategy. Section 5
describes our experimental setup and the results. Section 6 includes general discussions, alternate approaches
we experimented with, and lessons learned. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper and describes future
works.
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2 - Background and Related Works
2.1 Preliminaries
In this project we focus on ML/DL techniques used for log anomaly detection, as they can identify new
and unknown issues effectively.
Before ML/DL techniques can be used, however, the raw logs must be processed into an appropriate
format, based on the technique. The typical pipeline for using ML/DL for log anomaly detection is shown in
Fig. 1 below.

Fig. 1. Typical ML/DL Log Anomaly Detection Pipeline
First, the raw log messages are parsed to extract various fields of interest. These could include standard
fields like timestamp, source, and log level that are common in most logs. However, we might also be
interested in fields that are unique to specific logs or messages. For example, from the Hadoop Distributed
File System (HDFS) raw log show in Fig. 2, the standard fields that we can extract include the date
“081109”, time “203616”, PID “161”, log level “INFO”, and component
11

“dfs.DataNode$PacketResponder”. However, the remainder of this message “Received block
blk_4566277459864535342 of size 67108864 from /10.251.106.50” is the free text part that can vary
depending on the source code that produced the message [2]. To extract fields from this portion, we need a
template that describes which portion of the message are fixed string constants, and which portion are
variables. Such a “template” could be obtained through source code analysis [2]. The source code that
generated the message in this example might be printf(“Received block %s of size %d
from %s”, block_id, size, srcip), which would give us the template “Received block (.*) of
size (.*) from (.*)”, which we can use as a regular expression to parse the log and extract the values of the
fields block_id, size, and srcip. The “template” is also referred to as message type [9], log key [8], or event
type [3] by various researchers.

081109 203616 161 INFO dfs.DataNode$PacketResponder:
Received block blk_4566277459864535342 of size 67108864 from
/10.251.106.50
Fig. 2. Example HDFS Log
The fields extracted through such parsing could be used directly as input to ML/DL techniques as
categorical (discrete) or numerical features. However, these fields are often insufficient, as they all
correspond to a single event in time, and provide no information about the context. To capture higher level,
contextual information, additional feature extraction is often performed. This is commonly achieved by
grouping events together through time windows or common identifiers (e.g. block id) [3]. Then, for each
group, we calculate various statistics such as count, min/max, average, etc. of various quantities. For
example, in [3], the time is divided into intervals, and within each interval they count the number of each
type of events to construct an event count vector. In [2], such an event count vector is constructed for each
block id. These event count vectors are then used as feature vectors for various ML/DL techniques.
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2.2 Anomaly Detection
The ML/DL techniques used for anomaly detection can be broadly divided into supervised, unsupervised,
and semi-supervised [3], based on what kind of data is required for training. Fig. 3 below shows a broad
categorization of anomaly detection techniques based on our literature review. Note, this is not a
comprehensive list of all the possible anomaly detection techniques, but simply those we encountered in our
application domain.

Fig. 3. Taxonomy of Anomaly Detection Techniques in Recent Literature

There has been previous works using supervised approaches for anomaly detection involving the use of
Logistic Regression, Decision Trees, or Neural Networks as binary classifiers to directly classify behaviors
as normal or abnormal [3][4]. However, these techniques require both normal and abnormal data points
during training, which is often not a very practical requirement. Oftentimes, we won’t have labeled anomaly
data, as anomalies are by definition rare. Furthermore, even if we do have labeled anomaly data, a model
trained on such a dataset would only be able to detect types of abnormal activities represented in the training
set, and not new or unseen abnormal activities.
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Due to the large volume of logs generated by computers, we often do not have labeled data, as labeling
would be labor-intensive or infeasible. As such, unsupervised methods that require no labels at all, or semisupervised methods that only require data from the normal class [11], are much more practical. Many authors
do not make the distinction between unsupervised and semi-supervised anomaly detection methods, and
simply refer to models that require only normal (benign) data for training as unsupervised [13]. This is
understandable, since there is only one class label (i.e. “normal”) in the training data, and the class label is
not explicitly used by the ML/DL algorithms. Unsupervised/semi-supervised anomaly detection models can
be categorized into Statistical Modeling, Proximity-Based, Reconstruction-Based, Clustering-Based, and
others, as shown in Fig. 3.
In statistical modeling based anomaly detection, one constructs a parametric or non-parametric model
describing the distribution of data in the normal class [14]. Then, various statistics are used to evaluate new,
test points to see if they are significantly different from the normal class, and if they should be deemed
abnormal. Parametric models assume the normal class distribution follows some well-known family of
distribution (such as Gaussian) and uses relevant statistics (such as means and standard deviation) to
determine the probability that a certain data point came from that distribution. Non-parametric models do
not assume the data distribution follows some known distribution, but rather use frequency of baseline
observations to assign anomaly scores to new, test points. The weakness of statistical modeling based
approaches is that they are not able to handle problems with many independent variables (high
dimensionality) [14][15].
Proximity-based anomaly detection is based on the assumption that normal data points have similar
feature values and therefore lie close to one another in the feature space, while anomalous points have
significantly different feature values and hence lie far away. Proximity-based techniques can be further
divided into distance-based and density-based depending on the measure used for evaluation. In distancebased technique, one typically calculate the distance from a data point to its nearest neighbors and compare
that to some threshold for anomaly detection. In density-based approach, one calculates a local density for
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each point based on the number of its neighbors that lie within some distance. The weakness of proximitybased approaches is that they require the calculation and comparison of the distance between each pair of
data points, leading to a O(n2) run time for n number of data points [14]. Furthermore, as the number of
dimensions increase, data points become extremely sparse, and distances become less meaningful [14]. The
authors of [13] applied a density-based approach using Local Outlier Factor (LOF) to the detection of
anomalies in Internet-of-Things (IoT) traffic, and found the technique to perform extremely poorly compared
to other approaches.
Clustering based approaches are based on the assumption that there exists some underlying structure
within a dataset that allows us to group them into subgroups or clusters. The most popular clustering
technique used is K-Means, where the user specifies a k value representing the targeted number of clusters.
Then, through an iterative process the algorithm assigns the data points to one of k clusters and identify the
centroid of each cluster. Clustering based techniques are more efficient than proximity based techniques,
with a runtime linear or near-linear in the number of data points [14]. Clustering have been widely used for
anomaly detection in computer systems with some level of success. In [5], K-Means was used in a semisupervised setting, where clustering is performed on normal data from some baseline period to identify
normal behaviors, represented by baseline clusters and their centroids. During the detection phase, traffic
that deviates significantly from the baseline (measured by distance from the closest centroid) are deemed as
abnormal. The downside with the K-Means approach is that the selection of the parameter k, which represents
the targeted number of clusters, has significant impact on the accuracy, and it is not always apparent what a
suitable value is [6].
Reconstruction-based approaches are based on the assumption that the normal data points have a low
effective dimension, meaning it can be represented by a set of derived features that is smaller than the set of
original features used for its representation [14]. These techniques involve the use of feature reduction
techniques such as Principal Component Analysis (PCA) or neural network Autoencoders (AE), and the
appropriate interpretation of the model outputs for anomaly detection.
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In Principal Component Analysis (PCA), a set of principal components that are linear combinations of
the original features are derived based on the variance of the data. For use in anomaly detection, principal
components along which there are high data variation are referred to as normal subspaces (or normal
directions), while principal components along which there are low data variation are referred to as abnormal
subspaces (or abnormal directions). Anomaly detection can be done by looking for isolated points along the
abnormal subspaces that are distant from the rest of the data points [2][7]. Quantitatively, this is done by
calculating the projection distance of data points onto the abnormal subspaces, and comparing that to a
threshold. The intuition is that an isolated, distant point along the abnormal subspace is exhibiting a
correlation that is not exhibited by the majority of the points, so that point is likely to be anomalous. The
authors of [2] used PCA for log anomaly detection in Hadoop File System (HDFS) logs, and found it to be
effective in detecting many types of execution anomalies. One limitation of PCA is that they only capture
linear relationships between the original features; they cannot capture more complex, non-linear
relationships that exist in many systems [14].
In contrast to PCA, neural network autoencoders (AE) can capture non-linear relationships. This is
possible because neural networks are able to model non-linear relationships through a series of linear and
non-linear transformations, made possible by the application of various activation functions. Autoencoder is
a special type of neural network that consists of an encoder network that takes in the input and transforms it
into some latent representation (i.e. derived features). Then, a decoder network is used to reconstruct the
original input based on that latent representation. The latent representation is typically of a dimension
significantly lower than the input dimension. This setup, known as undercomplete, forces the network to
learn the most important relationships between the original input features, and transform them into a few
derived features that retain all the most important information. The decoder, which will be trained together
with the encoder, will learn to create a reconstruction of the original input based on the low-dimensional
representation. The error between the model’s reconstruction and the original input (known as the
reconstruction error), is used to update the model weights during training [16]. To use an autoencoder for
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anomaly detection, we train the network on data points from the normal class such that it can produce
reconstructions of normal inputs with minimal reconstruction losses. Then, in the detection stage, new
samples are fed into the model to create a reconstruction. If the reconstruction error exceeds some threshold,
the sample is deemed anomalous, otherwise it is deemed normal. The authors of [17] applied a deep
autoencoder to IoT traffic, and showed that it was effective in detecting Botnet attacks.
Some recent work for log anomaly detection takes inspiration from natural language processing (NLP),
by modeling systems logs in a way similar to a natural language sequences [8][9]. These are based on the
idea that logs are similar to natural language in that they have a certain “vocabulary” governed by the number
of unique log keys in the source code, and follow certain “grammar” rules due to program execution flow.
The authors of [9] used a Markov chain and the authors of [8] used a Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM)
neural network to model system logs for anomaly detection.
Based on experiments by [8], an anomaly detection system based on log key sequences alone can achieve
high accuracies in some datasets, such as the HDFS dataset published by [2]. Similarly, the work by [9]
showed that their log key sequence anomaly detection technique can achieve high accuracy on High
Performance Computing (HPC) system logs. However, for finer levels of scrutiny, a similar sequence
modeling approach can be applied to numerical features that can be extracted from logs, as demonstrated by
[3] and [8].

2.3 Concept Drift
An important issue to consider in anomaly detection is concept drift, which is the change in the statistical
distribution of a target variable over time. This is especially relevant for semi-supervised anomaly detection
systems that are trained on normal data from some baseline period.
An anomaly detection model that is trained in an offline manner on data from a baseline period will see
a reduction in accuracy over time. Specifically, when the normal system behavior changes, becoming
significantly different from its behavior during the baseline, we’ll commonly see a rise in false-positives,
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where normal samples are mistakenly identified as anomalies by the system. Therefore, an effective anomaly
detection system needs to be able to adapt to concept drift.
Relatively few previous work on anomaly detection considers concept drift. It is often treated as a separate
goal from obtaining a model that learns well and yields high accuracy. Regardless of the model used for
detection, the concept drift adaptation always involves updating the model over time.
In a naïve approach, one can simply train a new model from scratch based on a new set of data. However,
this approach is not very efficient. Ideally, one would be able to update a model incrementally by retraining
on just the new, recent samples, rather than the entire set of baseline data.
Most traditional machine learning techniques are not designed to allow for incremental update. As such,
one often has to modify existing algorithms to allow such capability. In [21], a general framework for concept
drift adaptation is proposed for clustering based anomaly detection systems, involving the update of baseline
exemplars (centroids) with new normal samples with some appropriate weights.
Neural networks on the other hand, are naturally able to learn in an incremental manner. That is, the
training data does not have to be considered as a whole. During training, we can divide the training data into
small batches, each of which is fed through the model separately to change the system weights a small
amount, in a direction that minimizes the loss function. Therefore, to adapt to concept drift, one can simply
maintain a small set of new, recent normal samples and retrain the model on that set periodically [8]. There
have been previous works that propose more complex mechanisms for adapting to concept drift by adaptively
increasing the number of neurons in the network [18]. However, if not managed properly, this approach
could lead to uncontrolled growth of the model.
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3 - Problem Statement
In this project, our goal is to build an anomaly detection system that can identify anomalies based on
analysis of computer-generated logs.
We focus on semi-supervised log anomaly detection, as we believe this setting to be applicable to most
real-world systems, where we won’t have labeled anomaly data, but could obtain data that is considered
normal or sufficiently normal from some baseline period based on the system administrator’s evaluation.
Another problem we tackle is concept drift, which is especially important for computer systems which
are dynamic and often change over time. In this paper, we evaluate and propose a concrete strategy for
effectively updating and retraining our model in an online manner to adapt to concept drift.

4 - Proposed Solution
Following the works of [8][9], we take a sequence modeling approach to log analysis. We treat our
goal of learning normal log sequences as a language modeling problem, the goal of which is to learn the
structure of a language by building a model that can take in previous tokens (words or characters), and
predict what the next token is expected to be based on those previous tokens.
In our application, we seek to build a system that can predict what the next log key is based on a series
of previous log keys. For anomaly detection, we train a model on normal sequences from some baseline
period. Then, in the detection phase, we apply the model continuously to predict the next expected event.
If the new event that arrives agrees with our model’s prediction, then it is flagged as normal, otherwise it
is treated as an anomaly.
In addition to being applied to sequences of discrete values like log keys, our system can also be
applied to continuous, numerical sequences, such as multi-variate time-series of measurements or
features. That is, the model predicts the next expected values of those features based on their values from
some previous historical window. If the difference (measured by mean-squared-error) between the actual
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values and the model’s prediction is within some threshold, then it is considered normal. It is abnormal
otherwise.
Our anomaly detection system has three components: Data Preprocessing Module, Core Anomaly
Detection Model, and Online Update and Retraining Module. We describe each of these in depth in the
following sections.

4.1 Data Preprocessing Module
In the data preprocessing phase, we parse the raw logs to extract various features and log keys as described
in Section 2, so that they can be processed by our anomaly detection model. Recall that log key, message
type, and event type are used by different researchers to refer to the same thing. For the rest of this paper, we
will use the term log key.
Together, the log keys will form a log key sequence, which represents the underlying execution sequence
of the code that printed those log keys. We’ll denote the set of all distinct log keys as K={k1, k2, k3,….,kn},
where there are n distinct log keys total.
Our goal is to train a model that can predict the next log key based on a recent sequence of log keys in
some historical window of size w (which is a hyperparameter that can be tuned). Therefore, we need to
segment our log key sequence into multiple input-output pairs, where each input consists of the log keys in
the historical window, and the output consists of the next log key.
To demonstrate this, with a window size w=3 and an observed log key sequence of [k14, k21, k6, k28, k4,
k35], we will derive the following 3 input-output pairs:


[k14, k21, k6] → k28



[k21, k6, k28] → k4



[k6, k28, k4] → k35
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Finally, we convert the log keys in both the input and output into one-hot vector representations, such
that they can be ingested by the anomaly detection model and be treated as a categorical variable (with
number of categories equal to the number of unique log keys).
For numerical sequences, we take a similar approach. From our logs, we derive multivariate time-series
of the form [v1, v2, v3, ..., vt,..., vm], where vt is a vector (or tuple) storing the values of all the relevant features
at time t, and m is the total number of time steps. Then, we segment this in a similar fashion as the log key
into multiple input-output pairs.
The feature vectors do not need to be converted to one-hot as they don’t take on categorical values.
However, different features may take on different numeric ranges. As such, we need to normalize the features
such that they have the same range. For each feature, we calculate the mean (µ) and standard deviation (σ)
of its value across the baseline period. Then, for each instance x of the feature, we compute its normalized
value x’ as follows:
x’ = ( x - µ ) / σ

(1)

This normalization is performed for each value of each feature. This normalization technique is referred to
as z-score normalization, and is useful when one doesn’t know the maximum and minimum possible value
of an attribute a priori [11]. This is the scenario we’re dealing with, as our training data consists of points
from only the baseline period, which most likely will not have data points spanning the entire possible range
for each feature.

4.2 Core Anomaly Detection Model
Our system is modular, in that different types of models can be used as the core anomaly detection model,
as long as it is compatible with the input and output format from the Data Preprocessing Module described
previously.
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The most common sequence modeling technique used is the Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) neural
network. LSTM is a type of Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) that uses three multiplicative gates—input
gate, output gate, and forget gate—to control gradient flow and alleviate the vanishing/exploding gradient
problems encountered when training RNNs on long sequences. Previous works [4][8] have used deep-LSTM
for log sequence modeling with promising results. Therefore, we built LSTM-based models as baseline for
comparison.
While our LSTM-based models yielded good accuracies, they suffered from long training time. So, we
set out to identify an architecture that improves the runtime while yielding equivalent or better accuracies.
The first strategy we undertook to reduce run time is to swap out the LSTMs for Gated Recurrent Units
(GRU), which is an alternate type of RNN that has fewer parameters than LSTMs. While this did improve
the training time, it led to a drop in accuracy.
Next, following the recent trend in using CNNs for sequence modeling, we built a deep CNN model that
uses 1D convolutions. This led to drastic improvements in run time due to the ability of CNNs to be
parallelized when performing convolutions with multiple filters. Unfortunately, this model also resulted in
the worst accuracy when compared to the RNN based models such as LSTM and GRU.
From these experimental architectures, we gained a few insights. Firstly, CNNs can in fact learn some
spatial information based on the ordered events, and can do so extremely efficiently through parallel
convolutions. However, its accuracy is sensitive to the choice of filter sizes. LSTMs, on the other hand, is
naturally able to capture relationships in sequences and have relatively stable accuracies over different
hyperparameter choices as shown by [8]. Lastly, we confirmed the conclusion by [4] and [8] that, when it
comes to LSTMs, a deeper model can achieve higher accuracies than a shallower model, but this is at the
cost of increased training time.
Based on these observations, we set out to design an architecture that captures both CNNs ability to
efficiently extract spatial features in a parallel fashion, and LSTMs superior ability to learn temporal
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relationships in sequences. The result is a hybrid CNN-LSTM architecture that uses variable filter sizes and
causal convolution to extract features which are then fed into an LSTM to make predictions. This model,
which we call “CausalConvLSTM” is shown in Fig. 4.
The CNN portion of the proposed architecture uses filters of different sizes in parallel to extract features
across different span of the input sequence, alleviating the concern of not specifying a suitable filter size for
the dataset.

Fig. 4. Proposed CausalConvLSTM Architecture
Furthermore, the use of causal convolution ensures that the implication of ordering is preserved even
after we concatenated all the features maps from the output of variable-sized convolutions together. This is
illustrated in Fig. 5.
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Fig. 5. Causal Convolution as Used in Our Architecture
Since the ordering remains meaningful in this output feature map, we can then use a LSTM to ingest it in
order, from the first location to the last. After ingesting the sequence of rich features from the CNN, the
LSTM’s hidden state vector is passed to a fully connected (FC) layer with same number of nodes as there
are log keys. Finally, the output of the FC layer is fed through a softmax function to produce a probability
distribution function across all the possible log key values. This probability distribution function is compared
with the actual one-hot encoding of the next log key from the training sample, and the categorical crossentropy loss function is used to determine the error gradient used to update the model weights during training.
Then, in detection stage, we feed our model the most recent log entries within a historical window of size
w. The model processes this sequence and outputs a probability distribution function across all possible log
keys. We rank the probabilities from most to least likely, and if the new log key that just arrived is among
the top g most likely predicted by the model, then it is treated as normal. Otherwise, it is treated as an
anomaly, and an alert is generated. Note, g is another hyperparameter that can be tuned, and is essentially
similar to a detection threshold. The smaller the g the more selective, and the larger it is, the less selective.
A g of 1 would mean we only consider log keys that match the model’s single top prediction as normal.
A model similar to the one shown in Fig. 4 can be used for anomaly detection on multi-variate numerical
time-series. The only difference is that the FC layer will have number of nodes equal to the number of
features, and the softmax activation function will be omitted. The model’s output will be its prediction of the
next set of values for those numerical features, and will be compared against the actual values using meansquared-error (MSE) loss function to determine the error gradient used to update the model weights during
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training. In detection stage, we feed our model the most recent numerical feature vectors within the historical
window, and the model outputs a prediction of what it expects the values of the numerical features to be
next. We calculate the mean-squared-error (MSE) between the model’s prediction and the actual observed
values of those numerical features, and if the MSE exceeds some threshold, then it is deemed anomalous.
Otherwise, it is deemed normal. The threshold to use for the MSE is a hyperparameter that can be tuned. We
will discuss how to establish suitable values for it in the performance evaluation section.
Based on our experiments, this hybrid model achieves comparable accuracies as the deep LSTM-only
models, while requiring significantly less training time.

4.3 Online Update and Retraining Module
In addition to screening new messages and alerting operators when an anomaly is detected, our proposed
system allows online training and model update to adapt to changes in system behavior over time (concept
drift).
By using a neural network as our core model, we can take advantage of neural networks’ natural ability
to learn in an incremental manner. That is, rather than taking the entire training dataset as a whole in the
learning process, it can update system weights iteratively based on small subsets of the training data. As
such, we can retrain the model on a few new samples to make minor updates without having to retrain the
model from scratch based on the entire training set with the new samples added. Based on this observation,
previous works have proposed adapting to concept drift by incrementally retraining the model on falsepositive samples identified by the operator [8]. However, no previous work we are aware of provides
concrete detail on how this retraining should be done.
To determine a concrete and robust retraining strategy, we proposed and evaluated many different online
retraining strategies. Based on our evaluation, an effective and generally applicable strategy is to trigger
retraining when the FP rate calculated from a rolling window of the most recent events exceeds some
specified threshold.
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5 - Performance Evaluation
As mentioned previously, our system is modular in that different core anomaly detection models can used
as long as its input and output format is compatible with those produced by the Data Preprocessing Module.
Similarly, the Online Update and Retraining Module can adopt different retraining strategies regardless of
the core anomaly detection model used, as long as it is a neural network based model.
To quantify and compare the performance of anomaly detection, we use the popular metrics Precision,
Recall, and F-Measure. These measures are defined in terms of the count of True-Positives (TP), FalseNegatives (FN), True-Negatives (TN), and False-Positives (FP) as specified by the equations below:
Precision = TP / (TP+FP)

(2)

Recall = TP / (TP+FN)

(3)

F-Measure = 2*Precision*Recall / (Precision+Recall)

(4)

Note, in the context of anomaly detection, “positive” means anomalous, and “negative” means normal.
The precision quantifies what portion of the points identified by the model as anomalous are actually
anomalous (per the ground-truth label). The recall quantifies what portion of the points that are actually
anomalous the model successfully detected. The F-measure, given as a harmonic mean of precision and
recall represents a holistic measure that takes into account both precision and recall [8]. For all three
measures, the higher the better.
Another measure of interest we use is the false-positive rate, calculated as FP / (FP + TN). This measure
quantifies the portion of normal samples that are mistakenly identified as anomalous by the system. We want
to keep this measure low, as an increase in the number of false-positives can overwhelm the operator and
cause him/her to distrust and ignore new alerts created by the system.
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5.1 Anomaly Detection Evaluation
The dataset we used for benchmarking our core model’s effectiveness for log key anomaly detection is
the HDFS dataset generated and published by the authors of [2]. This dataset consists of over 11 million log
entries generated over a period of 48 hours by a 203-node Hadoop cluster running in AWS [2]. The data set
has been used in various previous studies on log anomaly detection [2][3][7][8]. After generating these log
messages, the authors of [2] worked with Hadoop domain experts to identify and label blocks that
experienced abnormal execution. Using these block ids, we can group the messages into 558,221 normal
subsequences and 16,838 abnormal subsequences [8].
Following a semi-supervised anomaly detection approach and the work by [8], we train our model on
only the first 4,855 of normal samples (less than 1% of all the normal data points available). Then, we use
the rest of the normal and abnormal data points for testing and accuracy evaluation.
Across our experiments, we fix the historical window size (w) at 12, since this is the shortest length
observed among the 4,855 normal subsequences. For the hyperparameter g that specifies the top places to
compare the new sample against in the model output probability distribution, we used 5, as the experiments
by [8] showed that with g=5, 99.8% of the next log key in normal sequences is among the top-g log keys
predicted by their model. We can increase g, but the potential gain is marginal, and may result an increase
in false-negatives. This g parameter is similar to a detection threshold as we discussed previously.
We first implemented a stacked, Deep-LSTM model based on the description by [8]. This model achieved
very promising results but had a long training time. In an attempt to reduce the training time, we
experimented with various models including a Deep-GRU, a Deep-CNN, and finally our original
CausalConvLSTM model. The model parameters and their performance are summarized below.
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Table 1. Model Description and Performance Results on HDFS Dataset
Model
Layer 1
Layer 2
Layer 3
Layer 4
Layer 5
Training
Time
Precision
Recall
F-Measure

CausalConvLSTM

Deep-LSTM
LSTM with 75
Units
LSTM with 75
Units
FC Layer with 30
Nodes
-

Deep-GRU
GRU with 75 Units

Deep-CNN
Conv1D, 64 filters

GRU with 75 Units

Conv1D, 64 filters

FC Layer with 30
Nodes
-

Conv1D, 80 filters
Conv1D, 80 filters

LSTM with 96
Units
FC Layer with 30
Nodes
-

28s/epoch

25s/epoch

FC Layer with 30 Nodes
16s/epoch

15s/epoch

0.8968
0.9971
0.9443

0.8710
0.9959
0.9293

0.8949
0.9619
0.9272

0.8959
0.9972
0.9438

Conv1D, 64 filters

Fig. 6. Model Accuracies on HDFS Dataset
As these results show, the stacked, Deep-LSTM still maintained the best accuracy with a F-Measure of
0.9443. However, the training time of the Deep-LSTM model was also the longest of all the models
compared. The Deep-GRU had similar training times with worse accuracies. The Deep-CNN architecture
leads to significant reduction in run time due to its ability to take advantage of parallelization, however, this
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purely CNN-based model performed the worst of all 4 models compared. Finally, our proposed
CausalConvLSTM model achieved results that are essentially equivalent to the Deep-LSTM model, while
requiring almost half the training time.
To evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed model when used for numerical sequence modeling, we
needed a different dataset. The HDFS dataset has very few numeric features, and was not useful for
benchmarking numerical sequence modeling for anomaly detection [8].
The dataset we were able to obtain was the Canadian Institute for Cybersecurity’s Intrusion Detection
Evaluation Dataset (CICIDS2017), published by the authors of [12]. This dataset was generated from a test
network over a 5-day period (Monday-Friday), during which both normal and various attack traffic was
simulated. Throughout the simulation, packet-capture (PCAP) logs were collected. The researchers then used
their network packet analyzer CICFlowMeter to extract various numerical features from the PCAP logs. The
result is a multivariate time series, with the values of multiple features at each timestamp. The data was also
labeled to indicate normal traffic as well as the various types of attacks.
For our evaluation, we used the data from the first day (Monday) of the simulation as baseline. This day
contained only normal traffic. We used 80% of this day’s traffic for training and reserved 20% as a validation
set, which is used to help us establish detection thresholds for the mean-squared-error (MSE). The reason is
that we want to obtain prediction errors on normal data points the model was not trained on. Therefore, after
training the model on the training set, we apply it to each point in the validation set and calculate the MSE
between the model prediction and the ground-truth. This gave us a list of model prediction errors across the
validation set. Fig. 7 shows a histogram of the MSE values when our CausalConvLSTM model is applied to
the validation set.
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Fig. 7. Histogram of MSEs from Validation Set (CICIDS2017, CausalConvLSTM Model)
Based on Fig. 7, we realized that the MSE losses is highly skewed. As a result, we cannot use means and
standard deviations to establish the threshold. Instead, we chose to use the quantile statistic to help us
establish the detection threshold. Specifically, we found a threshold set at the 90% quantile of the validation
set MSE values gave us the best F-Measure.
For testing, we picked a day from the dataset that contained the most diverse attacks. Specifically, the
data from Wednesday, which included normal data mixed with various types of attacks including Slowloris,
Slowhttptest, Hulk, GoldenEye, and Heartbleed. We treated all the attacks as anomalies (or “positive”)
instances in our metric calculation, and the rest as normal (or “negative”) instances. Our CausalConvLSTM
model achieved an F-Measure of 0.76, which is slightly better than a GRU model we also implemented for
comparison, which had an F-Measure of 0.74. However, the CausalConvLSTM model required almost half
the training time compared to the GRU model, when trained on the same workstation. The results are
summarized in Table 2 and Fig. 8 below.
Table 2. Model Performance Results on CICIDS2017 Dataset
Model
Precision
Recall
F-Measure
Training Time

GRU
CausalConvLSTM
0.77
0.84
0.72
0.69
0.74
0.76
239 s/epoch
151 s/epoch
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Fig. 8. GRU vs CausalConvLSTM on CICIDS2017 Dataset

Our experiment results show that rather than having a deep homogenous model with multiple layers of
the same architecture (either all RNN or all CNN), it is worth considering a hybrid model with mixed
architecture. Designed properly, a hybrid model can achieve equivalent or better results while requiring less
training time, allowing us to take advantage of the strengths of different architectures.

5.2 Online Update and Retraining Evaluation
For evaluating drift, we needed a dataset that actually exhibits change in normal system behavior over
time. Based on our preliminary experiments, the HDFS Dataset proved to be unsuitable for drift analysis, as
the normal system behavior is relatively stable over time. This could be due to the fact that the logs from that
dataset only spans about 2 days, which is far too short a time period for significant system change to take
place. The same is expected of the CICIDS2017 dataset, which spans only 5 days.
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For this evaluation, we identified a dataset published by the authors of [10], which consists of system
logs generated by a Blue Gene/L supercomputer (“BGL Dataset”). This dataset consists of 215 days’ worth
of logs, involving over 4 million log messages, of which 7.33% were labeled as abnormal by domain experts.
This dataset was used by the authors of [8] for the purpose of drift evaluation.
In a setup similar to that proposed in [8], we assume there’s an analyst who is alerted when an anomaly
is detected, and who can flag the alert as a false-positive if the entry is actually determined to be normal
based on the analyst’s evaluation. In our retraining system, we want to save these labeled false-positive
entries and use them to update the model later on. These entries represent examples of new normal behavior
that our model should know about. As for the true negatives, the model does not need to be retrained on
them, because it already knows to treat them as normal. The remaining question is, when should we retrain
the model.
We implemented different retraining strategies. We chose as our baseline the first 10% of data, and used
the normal data points from the baseline period for training the model. Then, we used the rest of the 90% of
data for testing. Fig. 9 below compares the resulting overall FP rate on the entire test set, when different
retraining strategies are used.

Fig. 9. Overall FP Rate on Entire BGL Test Set with Different Retraining Strategies (GRU AD Model)
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The first retraining strategy we tested is to trigger a retrain periodically either based on time elapsed or
number of records screened since the last retrain. A downside of this approach is that it has no regard to the
FP count or rate, and may therefore retrain even when there’s no need to. Additionally, the selection of the
retrain interval has significant effect on the performance.
The second approach we experimented with is to have a system that triggers a retrain based on some
threshold on the FP count. A retrain is triggered whenever the accumulated FP count since the last retrain
exceeds the threshold. We noticed that for this approach, the choice of the FP count threshold again has
significant effect on the overall accuracy.
The next approach we experimented with is based on the FP rate. A retrain is triggered whenever the FP
rate exceeds some threshold. While experimenting with this scheme we noticed that there are multiple ways
to define the FP rate, and how the FP rate is defined has significant impact on the model performance. Three
different ways to define the FP rate are as follows: cumulative FP rate, fixed window FP rate, and rolling
window FP rate.
The cumulative FP rate is calculated by keeping a count of all the false-positives and true-negatives of
the system since the beginning of the detection (testing) phase, and calculating the FP rate based on those
cumulative counts at each step.
The fixed window FP rate is calculated by dividing the time into fixed, non-overlapping increments and
tallying the false-positives and true-negatives within each increment to calculate the FP rate.
The rolling window FP rate is calculated by tallying the false-positives and true-negatives within a
moving/rolling window that encompasses only the most recent events.
Based on our experiments, the cumulative FP rate is not suitable as it misses many momentary spikes in
false-positives due to an averaging effect. If there was a prior period of good accuracy followed by a sudden
increase in the number of false-positives in quick succession, those new false-positives still would not be
sufficient to raise the cumulative FP rate significantly.
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FP rate based on fixed, non-overlapping windows are better at capturing momentary spikes in the number
of false-positives. However, we’re left to the mercy of how the windows are divided, and may or may not
capture the highest FP rate if an increase in the number of false-positives happens to land on the boundary
between two windows. On the other hand, a rolling window that slides over the timeline would capture all
possible divisions ensuring we’ll cover a window that has the highest number of false-positives. Based on
these observations, we decided that a FP rate based on a rolling window is the most appropriate for use with
our retraining strategy. Therefore, we propose calculating the rolling window FP rate at each time step,
comparing it to a threshold, and triggering a retrain if the FP rate exceeds the threshold.
From our experiments, a retrain strategy that is triggered when the rolling FP rate exceeds a certain
threshold resulted in the lowest overall FP rate of 0.0056 (0.56%). We also observed that the overall FP rate
will stay near the threshold we’ve set. This makes the threshold more meaningful than a threshold on the FP
count, as a system administrator is likely to have an idea of what a desirable FP rate might be for his/her
system.
Fig. 10 below shows the accuracy measures over time with this retraining strategy. We see that the
precision, recall, F-Measure and overall accuracy all stayed relatively high, while the FP rate stayed very
low. This indicates that our retraining strategy is effective.
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Fig. 10. GRU Model Metrics over Time, with Retraining Based on Rolling Window FP Rate
Lastly, we compared the runtime of the system with and without retraining. Without retraining, the
amortized runtime to screen each event is about 1.1 milliseconds, when tested on our mid-range personal
workstation. With retraining, the amortized runtime to screen each event is about 0.03 milliseconds longer
than for a system without retraining, when tested on the same workstation. This difference in runtime is
insignificant considering the improvement in accuracy obtained. Furthermore, as pointed out by [8], the
retraining could be done in parallel to detection using a copy of the old model, so that detection time will
not be affected at all. The models can then be swapped when retraining is complete.
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6 – Discussion and Lessons Learned
In this chapter, we take a step back and review some lessons learned from the various experiments
conducted as part of this project. This includes reviewing the other anomaly detection techniques that we
experimented with which do not take a sequence modeling based approach.

6.1 Alternate Approaches (Non-Sequence Based)
As discussed in the background section, there are many anomaly detection techniques. However, not
all anomaly detection techniques are suitable for our specific problem of anomaly detection from computer
logs. Statistical modeling and proximity-based anomaly detection approaches were precluded from our
application because they don’t perform well in high-dimensional space [14]. On the other hand, clustering
based techniques and reconstruction-based techniques have been shown to be effective for anomaly
detection from computer logs [2][6][7][19]. As such, we also implemented and evaluated these
techniques, applying them to the same datasets we have used to evaluate the sequence modeling based
approaches.
Specifically, we evaluated K-Means to represent the clustering-based approach, and a neural network
autoencoder to represent the reconstruction-based approach. However, as these techniques don’t operate
on sequences like our proposed CausalConvLSTM, the data needs to be preprocessed in a different
manner. To apply these methods to the HDFS dataset, we follow the approach by [2] and [3] to create an
event count vector for each block id, which stores the occurrences of each type of event associated with
that that block from the logs. Each event count vector then represents a feature vector. For both the KMeans and Autoencoder based approach, we train the models on 4,855 normal event count vectors parsed
from the first 100,000 log entries [8], and test on the event count vectors parsed from the rest of the logs.
For K-Means, we used the same approach discussed in the background section for anomaly
detection, as outlined below:
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1. Perform K-Means clustering on the training set to derived k-clusters and their associated
centroids. These clusters and centroids will represent our baseline.
2. For each new test instance x, calculate its distance to the closest baseline centroid.
3. If the distance exceeds our threshold T, flag the instance as anomalous. If the distance is less than
the threshold T, the instance is considered normal.
The target number of clusters (k) and the threshold (T) are hyperparameters. Since we perform
clustering on only normal training data, k can be considered to be the expected number of types of normal
system behaviors. System knowledge or previous, related application can provide some hint as to the
appropriate ranges of k to use, or one can simply experiment with different k values to see which one
yields the best results. We consulted previous works [5] and [6] for approximate ranges of k, and then
simply tried all the values. The results are summarized in Fig. 11. Note, as we have not settled on an
appropriate distance threshold, we initially set it as the average distance of each baseline data point to its
respective cluster centroid, plus three standard deviations. This is based on the assumption that these
distances follow a normal distribution, and 99.7% of the observations are expected to lie within 3
standard-deviations, according the “68-95-99.7” rule.
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Fig. 11. K-Means Accuracy vs Target Number of Clusters (HDFS Dataset)
We found that k=6 gave us the best accuracy based on the overall F-Measure. Therefore, we
determined that this is the most suitable selection for this dataset.
The next parameter we need to determine is the threshold (T). For setting detection thresholds, one
typically rely on confidence intervals of well-known statistical distributions (such as a Gaussian) [8],
which was what we did initially. Unfortunately, our experiments showed that the distances of data points
from their centroids do not follow a normal distribution; therefore, our initial threshold setting based on
the “68-95-99.7” rule was not appropriate. As such, we experimented with different distance thresholds,
and found a threshold set at near the 99th percentile of the distances of the validation set data points to
their nearest centroids to work the best. With this selection, we obtained a precision of 0.72, recall of
0.61, and F-measure of 0.66.
Next, we created a deep multi-layer perceptron autoencoder (MLP-AE) that is also trained on the
event count vectors from the baseline period. As the frequency of different types of events can vary (some
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events naturally occur much more often than others), we needed to normalize the counts of each type of
events to bring them in the same range. We do so by using z-score normalization [11] as discussed
previously. The model is then trained to minimize the reconstruction losses when applied to event count
vectors of normal execution sequences. At detection stage, we extract the event count vectors of new
sequences and feed them into the autoencoder to get a reconstruction. Then, we calculate the
reconstruction loss between the reconstruction and the input. If the reconstruction loss exceeds a certain
threshold, it is deemed anomalous. Otherwise, it is deemed normal.
To establish the threshold for the reconstruction loss, we applied the autoencoder to a validation set,
which consists of normal data points the model was not trained on. This gave us an idea of the range of
thresholds to try. In the end, the threshold that gave the best performance was at around the 99th percentile
of the reconstruction losses when the model is applied to the validation set. This gave us a precision of
0.67, recall of 0.66, and F-Measure of 0.66.
The following figure compares the accuracy measures of clustering-based approach (K-Means),
reconstruction-based approach (MLP-AE), and sequence modeling approach (CausalConvLSTM) applied
to the same HDFS dataset.
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Fig. 12. Clustering, Reconstruction, and Sequence-Based AD Comparison (HDFS Dataset)
Based on this experiment, we observe that the sequence modeling approach far out-performed the
clustering and reconstruction based approach. This is somewhat expected because the feature used by our
K-Means and deep MLP-AE models are the event count vectors. Since the event count vectors simply
tally the number of each type of events that occurred for that execution sequence, the ordering
information is not preserved. Therefore, the decision made by the K-Means and deep MLP-AE models do
not take ordering in to consideration. The sequence-based approach (CausalConvLSTM) on the other
hand, ingests the sequence of event types directly; therefore, it is able to consider the order of event types,
and discover sequential relationships. As the ordering of events is important for the execution path
anomalies present in this data set [2], it is no surprise that the sequence modeling based
CausalConvLSTM performed better.
To further evaluate these different classes of anomaly detection techniques, we also compared them
using the CICIDS2017 dataset. As described previously, this dataset contains numerical features
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generated by a network packet analyzer [12]. The timestamp in the dataset allows us to order and treat
these data points as a multi-variate time-series, as we’ve done in the sequence modeling approach
described previously. Alternatively, we could consider the set of features at each timestamp individually
(independent of its surrounding time steps), and try to make a determination based on the information
from that point in time alone; this is the approach we’ll take when applying the clustering-based model
and the reconstruction-based model.
As before, we performed z-score normalization to ensure all the features are in similar ranges. We
train the models on the baseline data from the first day (Monday), which consisted of only normal traffic.
For the clustering-based anomaly detection, we run the K-means algorithm on the baseline training
data with k=6, grouping the baseline data points into 6 clusters and obtaining the centroids of each of
these clusters. These clusters and centroids represent our baseline, normal behavior. Then, in detection
stage, we screen new entries by calculating their distance to the closest centroid. If the distance exceeds a
certain threshold, it is deemed anomalous. Else, it is deemed normal. Through our experiments, we found
a threshold set at around the 97th percentile of the distances between the validation set data points and
their nearest baseline centroid yielded the best accuracy.
For the reconstruction-based anomaly detection, we built a deep MLP-AE with input and output
layers both with number of nodes equal to the number of features. The bottleneck of the MLP-AE is set at
64% the size of the input. This forces the MLP-AE to learn a reduced-dimension representation of the
higher-dimension input, from which it can reconstruct the original input with minimal loss. The MLP-AE
was then trained on the normal baseline data. Then, in detection stage, we screen new entries by feeding
them through the MLP-AE to obtain a reconstruction. We then calculate the MSE reconstruction error
between the reconstruction and the input. If the reconstruction error exceeds a threshold, it is deemed
anomalous, else it is deemed normal. Through our experiments, we found a threshold set at around the
97th percentile of the validation set reconstruction losses to give the best accuracy.
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We applied our clustering, reconstruction, and sequence-based anomaly detection systems to the
CICIDSD17 data from Wednesday, which included normal data mixed with various types of attacks
including Slowloris, Slowhttptest, Hulk, GoldenEye, and Heartbleed. The accuracy results are shown in
Fig. 13 below for comparison.

Fig. 13. Clustering, Reconstruction, and Sequence-Based AD Comparison (CICIDS17 Dataset)
Surprisingly, on this dataset, the K-Means based anomaly detection model outperformed deep MLPAE and CausalConvLSTM. This is in contrast to the HDFS dataset, where the K-Means based approach
performed the worst. The fact that our sequence modeling based CausalConvLSTM performed worst here
is especially surprising, since it is able to consider sequential relationships, rather than treat each data
point as an isolated, independent instance, which was how it was treated by the MLP-AE and K-Means
models. Based on some literature review, we came across another paper [20], which also experimented
with a sequence-modeling based approach on this dataset. Their experiments also showed that a simpler,
frequency-based method out-performed a more complex LSTM-based model [20], and concluded that this
is most likely because there isn’t much valuable information encoded in the sequences in this dataset. The
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data set was created by a packet analyzer, so each data point already summarizes multiple events that took
place over a short time window, and this information was sufficient for detecting the types of anomalies
involved in this dataset.
While a sequence modeling based approach is more general in that it can capture any sequential
relationships that may exist, for the CICIDS17 dataset, the sequence information proved to be
unimportant. Therefore, by including information from multiple time steps, we’re likely diluting the
discriminating power of information that can be gained from a single time step alone. This is likely the
reason that a sequence-based approach performed slightly worse than those that do not consider sequence
information, as demonstrated by our experiments as well as those by [20].

6.2 Lessons Learned
An important lesson learned from this project is the importance of evaluating the data itself early on.
This includes inspecting the raw data as well as attempting to understand the underlying behaviors
represented by the data.
The larger a data set, the higher the chance that something could go amiss. For instance, while
parsing the BGL data set, we inspected the first few lines of the log to get the general format, and
implemented our parser based on the assumption that the rest of the data will follow the same format.
Then as extra precaution, we ran our parser on a subset of the log file (the first 1,000 lines) and made sure
it performed correctly. Unfortunately, when we proceeded to run the parser on the entire set of over 4
million log entries, we encountered various corrupted log lines, including timestamp fields with
unexpected text (spilled over from other fields), unexpected line break character ‘\n’ in the log level field,
as well as missing fields. To fix these issues, we needed to include special cases in our parsing logic to
handle when things go awry. The CICIDS2017 dataset also contained inconsistencies. Specifically, the
CSV file published by the author contained lines with no field values, but simply the comma separators.
Also, some labels used a version of the dash symbol that is not recognized by UTF-8 encoding. The
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lesson learned is that, when it comes to large volumes of data, what can go wrong will more likely go
wrong, so we should anticipate and take the appropriate precautions, such as making our data
preprocessing code more robust to handle special cases.
Once we’ve taken care of these low-level issues with the raw data itself, we also need to understand
the behavior of the data. For example, we initially tried to use the HDFS data set for drift analysis, as well
as for benchmarking the numerical-sequence modeling effectiveness of our model. However, after initial
experiment, we discovered that the HDFS dataset did not actually exhibit drift behavior; that is, the
normal system behavior stayed relatively constant throughout the 2-day simulation done by the authors
[2]. Additionally, these logs contained only a few numeric parameters, and they occurred very
infrequently, resulting in insufficient data to perform meaningful sequence modeling. The original creator
of the HDFS dataset [2] also stated that they only identified and labeled the execution anomalies by
identifying the sessions (i.e. block_id) that went through abnormal execution. They did not consider any
of the numerical features when labeling anomalies. It is for these reasons that [8] only applied log key
anomaly detection to the HDFS dataset, and used separate datasets for benchmarking numerical sequence
modeling and drift adaptation.
Through our series of experiments, what we discovered is that there is no one-size-fit-all solution for
log anomaly detection. That is, not all anomaly detection techniques can be applied to all types of logs
with great result. Our sequence modeling based approach takes a step toward creating a more general
solution, as it can ingest sequences of events directly rather than relying on the user to engineer the best
features that capture the inherent relationships in sequences. However, there’s no guarantee that it will
always outperform custom solutions hand-picked and designed for specific applications.
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7 - Conclusion & Future Work
In this project, we evaluated various techniques used for log anomaly detection. We built upon
previous anomaly detection techniques that seek to model log sequences directly using neural networks.
Based on observations from our experiments, we designed an original hybrid neural network architecture
called “CausalConvLSTM” that takes advantage of CNN’s ability to efficiently extract spatial features in a
parallel fashion, and LSTM’s superior ability to learn the relationships in sequential data. Through our
experiments, we showed that our model can achieve high accuracy for anomaly detection after training on
only a small amount of normal log data. Furthermore, our model requires less training time than previous
state-of-the-art architectures, while achieving comparable accuracies. Additionally, we address the concept
drift problem by performing evaluations of different online retraining strategies for neural network based
anomaly detection systems, and propose a concrete strategy that was effective in maintaining high
accuracies and low false-positive rates as demonstrated by our experiments. Future work could involve
applying our proposed system to additional types of log data or the incorporation of a module to help users
more easily diagnose identified anomalies.
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